Bill Cooke
ERNESTINE ROSE: AN ATHEIST AND FEMINIST PIONEER
Springtime in Boston. April
1861. The United States is bitterly divided. Cultural wars have
festered for several decades around questions of how American
democracy should look. What were the limits of democracy? Should
blacks be able to participate in the democratic process. What about
women? What role should religion play in government and in society?
In only a few days the most explosive of these faultlines would
plunge the country into the worst disaster of its history. This was
the question of slavery. For more than twenty years a vocal minority
had energised the sluggish majority in the northern states to
recognise that slavery was wrong. It was wrong morally and it was
wrong socially. Whether it was wrong religiously was still the most
divisive and vexed aspect of this most difficult issue. Foremost
among these campaigners was Ernestine Rose (1810-1891). But unlike
the majority of abolitionist campaigners, Ernestine Rose saw the
bigger picture. Freeing women from oppression was linked intimately
to freeing slaves from oppression. And any freedom from oppression
meant nurturing a free mind.
From her earliest days as a
child in the short-lived Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Ernestine Potowska
was made aware of the contest between progress and reaction. The
Grand Duchy was created by Napoleon out of the western parts of
Poland seized by Prussia in the last quarter of the eighteenth
century. Ranged against this promise of progress and freedom were the
forces of reaction, championed by the twin pillars: autocracy and
organised religion. And few people valued the comparative freedoms of
Napoleonic Europe more than Jews. For centuries subject to Christian
anti-Semitism, for a brief few years, Jews could dream of a future
free from hatred.
The Hebrew Bible of her
upbringing and the Christian Bible of the societies she spent her
adult years in pulsed with restrictions: restrictions on how to
behave, on what to think, and on who to associate with. Rose’s
latest biographer is correct to say that, for someone raised an
orthodox Jew there was no serious option between full observance or
atheism. (Anderson, pp 14-15) Potowska chose atheism. Atheism meant
emancipation from the most fundamental of the restrictions which
hemmed in her, and everyone else’s, life. The Bible clearly
presupposes the subservience of women and the existence of slavery.
Rather than urging reform of injustices, the New Testament in
particular, counsels those in menial roles to accept their lot. With
the Second Coming of Christ just around the corner, it was not felt
necessary to revise social conditions on an earth about to change
fundamentally.
To this day, many Christians
remain in denial about the extent of support given to slavery by
followers of Jesus. Even during Rose’s lifetime Christian
apologists were airbrushing any taint of heterodoxy out of the story
of emancipation. One of the most influential of these was Charles
Loring Brace (1826-1890), who declared in the 1880s that no one ‘who
knew anything of the anti-slavery reformers in the United States,
will doubt that their career was begun and carried on under the
purest influence of Christ’s truths.’ (Brace, p. 382)
But, as Brace must have known full well, supporting slavery, along
with the refusal to countenance equality for women, could and was
done in the full odour of sanctity. Rev Henry Jackson van Dyke
(1822-91) was one of many pro-slavery apologists who defended slavery
on specifically Christian grounds. Abolitionism, van Dyke argued, was
inherently evil. In front of a large New York audience towards the
end of 1860, van Dyke declared
‘I am here tonight in
God’s name, and by His help, to show that the tree of
abolitionism is evil and only evil, root and branch, flower and leaf
and fruit; that it springs from, and is nourished by an utter
rejection of the Scriptures; that it produces no real benefit to the
enslaved, and is the fruitful source of division and strife and
infidelity in both Church and State.’ (van Dyke, p 6)
The link between
abolitionism and infidelity was made so frequently, and often with a
strong streak of intolerance, that it continually exercised the
abolitionist movement. Many Southern clergymen were content to
discredit the case for abolition simply by claiming one could only be
an infidel to make such an outlandish claim. So corrosive was this
charge that many convinced abolitionists were anxious to deflect it
by distancing the movement from any suggestion of links to distinctly
non-religious, let alone atheist, arguments.
So for Ernestine Rose to
rise to prominence in the American abolitionist movement is something
remarkable. Because Ernestine Rose was a Jew, a woman, a foreigner,
and an infidel: the worst nightmare of many a defender of slavery. It
is important to recognise that these were not incidental qualities;
they were seen by many of her opponents as root and branch the reason
she argued as she did. In the face of provocations such as this, some
opponents of Rose did not scruple to inflate still further the abuse.
The best known of these was a clergyman in Maine who, under the cloak
of anonymity, declared “it would be shameful to listen to this
woman, a thousand times below a prostitute.” (Bangor
Mercury
Nov 3 1855, quoted in Suhl, p 176)
When not being openly
abused, other critics preferred to condescend. Rose’s accent,
her gloves, the ringlets in her hair; anything was commented on as a
means to belittle her and keep the focus on her otherness. Even among
supporters of abolition, many were nervous about being linked in
public with infidels like Ernestine Rose. It is to the great credit
of Susan B Anthony and other leaders of the movement, that this timid
counsel of excluding Rose from the speaking platform was ignored.
(Suhl, p 198)
The reason Ernestine Rose
retained her prominent position in the movement was a simple one: she
was an outstanding communicator, and spoke with the authenticity that
makes connections. Rose had, wrote her biographer, the ‘happy
faculty of being able to illuminate a subject with the bright light
of logic without sacrificing the quality of human emotion.’
(Suhl, p 121) Year in and year out, Rose defended, extended and
articulated the related causes of abolitionism and women’s
rights. The abuse and condescension was constant, and not
infrequently her meetings were disrupted by violence, often stirred
up by the tabloid press of the day.
In the face of provocation
over such a long period, it is hardly surprising that Rose did not
speak on atheism more often. But she knew that speaking in such a way
before the battle against slavery and for women’s rights had
gathered momentum would be to embolden her calumniators. The
freethought movement was only just finding its way and did not meet
that often. But when a freethought meeting was convened at the
Mercantile Hall in Boston in 1861, Rose thought it time to speak
openly about her atheism. A
Defence of Atheism
turned out to be one of the most authentic, cogent and convincing
expressions of atheism ever written.
Atheism
before 1861
Before we look at what Rose
said, we need first to survey the intellectual world she would have
been exposed to. Who had Rose read to produce a work like this? The
core principles of Rose’s atheism were set before she emigrated
to the United States in 1836. Rose’s biographers all emphasise
the influence of Robert Owen (1771-1858) on Rose’s life and
thought. Her years in England were a time of freethought ferment, and
she quickly immersed herself in the Owenite movement. This will have
offered her a rich, passionate and varied education. Owen’s
book, A New
View of Society
(1816) was a radical call for a new set of values around education,
social care, bans on child labour and alleviating the worst forms of
inequality. The following year, in a speech in London, Owen announced
his independence from religious belief. A public declaration of this
sort was a scandal to many, an inspiring act of courage to many
others. This address can, in several ways, be seen as a model for
Rose’s subsequent career. Owen outlined the obstacles to the
effective and permanent relief of the poor. Chief among them was an
impoverished outlook on the world. It will be futile, Owen said,
‘to erect villages of
union and mutual cooperation; for it will be vain to look on this
search for inhabitants to occupy them, who
can understand how to live in the bond of peace and unity;
or who can love their neighbour as themselves, whether he be Jew or
Gentile, Mahomedan or Pagan, Infidel or Christian. Any religion that
creates one particle of feeling short of this is false
and must prove a curse on the whole human race! Robert Owen, speech
delivered at the City of London tavern, August 21 1817, reprinted in
A New View of Society and Other Writings, p 217). And when Owen spoke of the
whole human race, he really meant the whole human race, taking care
specifically to include non-white people in his vision.
But while Owen’s
influence was certainly great, it would be wrong to see Rose as just
another Owenite. Without doubt Owen supplied much of the ethical
motivation
for her atheism, but the actual arguments came from a broader field.
So, too, did the examples. Outside the Owenite movement, prominent
among the freethought champions of this period was Richard Carlile
(1790-1843), who spent altogether more than nine years in prison
between 1817 and 1835, defending the rights of free speech. The
longest spell was a three-year term of imprisonment for republishing
Thomas Paine’s Age
of Reason.
Unable to pay the impossibly high fine of £1500, Carlile’s
term was doubled from three to six years. Carlile’s atheism, no
less than Robert Owen’s, was linked with a strong sense of the
need for social reform, as was Ernestine Rose’s.
Closely bound up with
Carlile was the presence of heroic female freethinkers who cannot but
have inspired the young Polish refugee. While Carlile was
incarcerated, his common-law wife Eliza Sharples Carlile (c.
1805-1852) courageously held the fort in his absence. She became a
prominent freethought lecturer in her own right. Also active at this
time was Emma Martin (1812-1851), whose thoughts on women’s
rights mixed easily with her freethought principles.
From higher up the social
ladder, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was a fierce critic of religion.
His works The
Church of England Catechism Explained
(1818), Analysis
of the
Influence
of Natural Religion on the Temporal Happiness of Mankind
(1822) and Not
Paul, but Jesus
(1823) were scathing indictments of organised religion as a blight on
happiness, monuments of inconsistency and a parade of folly. The
direct influence of these works is less clear, but at the very least,
Rose is likely to have known of them. The indirect influence of these
works, via Robert Owen, however, is profound, as Owenism is a
practical application of Bentham’s utilitarianism.
Still further up the social
ladder Percy Bysshe Shelley had produced some explosively influential
poems and essays that reverberated around radical circles for
decades. Pirate publications of Shelley’s poem Queen
Mab
denunciation of tyranny and religion’s sordid role as an
abettor to tyranny were widely read. Less widely read, but widely
known about, was Shelley’s short essay ‘The necessity of
atheism’, for which he was expelled from University College,
Oxford on March 25 1811.
As well as these current
publications and lecturers, older freethought material was available.
Works by, and summaries of, the writings of radicals like Spinoza,
d’Holbach, Thomas Paine and Mary Wollstonecraft were
circulating. While in France Rose may well have come across the story
of Olympe de Gouge (1748-1793). This remarkable woman wrote a play
called Negro
Slavery in
1774 which was far too radical to be published in the ancien
regime. It
was first performed only in 1789. De Gouge quickly became
disenchanted with the limitations of the emancipatory rhetoric of the
French revolutionaries, and so in 1791 penned the Declaration
of the Rights of Woman,
a passionate appeal for equality of the sexes. She was guillotined in
1793 for satirising the revolution. Olympe de Gouge was every bit the
forerunner of Ernestine Rose.
Once Rose was in the United
States, she would have come across the American radicals: people like
Ethan Allen, Elihu Palmer and Philip Freneau. All these men were
deists, though, so it’s not clear how far Rose would have
learned from them that she had not already he learned in England. The
deist we know Rose responded warmly to was Thomas Paine, whose memory
she passionately defended for her entire life.
Later influences include
Victor Hugo, whose poems Rose discovered while in Paris in 1856. One
of which, in Judgment
she called ‘sublime thing, and as bold and strong as
beautiful.’ (Suhl, p 184) It is also unlikely Rose was not at
least familiar with the new scholarship of David Friedrich Strauss
(1808-1874) and Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872).
Ernestine
Rose’s atheism
A very good case can be made
that Ernestine Rose was influenced by some other thinkers every bit
as much as she was by Robert Owen. One influence that stands out is
that of the German polymath Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859). Of
the very few names specifically mentioned in the Defence
of Atheism,
the most significant is ‘Humboldt’, who alone is praised
as a man of unusual courage. (p 16) But was Rose referring to Wilhelm
von Humboldt (1767-1835), the great Prussian educator, or his younger
brother Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859) the explorer and
scientist? Either one would qualify as someone Rose would hold in
high esteem, but it was clearly Alexander who she had in mind.
Alexander von Humboldt had visited the United States in 1804, where
he was feted by Thomas Jefferson and became an instant celebrity
after his heroic adventures in South America exploring volcanoes,
collecting a vast range of plant specimens and measuring everything.
Though Humboldt and Jefferson got along famously, and had a lot in
common, one area they did not agree on was slavery. After seeing
Spanish mistreatment of slaves in South America, Humboldt was a
lifelong abolitionist. He saw, before anyone else, the link between
slavery and colonialism and, quite apart from the moral objections,
also understood slavery as a limiting and self-defeating way to
manage an economy. Though adapted differently to the challenges of
geography and climate, Humboldt insisted that all races of ‘a
common type’. (Wulf, pp 106-8)
Decades later, Humboldt
became a household name in the United States after the publication in
1845 of his enormously influential work, Cosmos.
This was Humboldt’s magnum opus, his big-picture account of the
workings of nature, and our place in it. After a long introduction
which outlined his weltanschaunng,
the book was divided into three parts: celestial, terrestrial and
organic, where Humboldt stressed the inter-connections of all things.
It was hard not to notice the complete absence of any mention of God
in the book. Instead, Humboldt spoke of the ‘wonderful web of
organic life.’ (Wulf, p 246) The second volume, which appeared
in 1847 then gave a magisterial history of humanity, placed in its
natural surroundings. It
was
available in English in the United States after 1849 and was
enormously influential.
It’s when one looks at
the structure of Rose’s Defence
of Atheism
that Humboldt’s impact is most clear. The 39 paragraphs of
Rose’s address follow the schema of Cosmos,
which moved from the heavens, through the physical sciences to the
social sciences and on to humanity’s account of its situation.
Paragraphs 2-7: physical
sciences do not endorse theism
Paragraphs 8-11: an account
of social sciences and religion
Paragraphs 11-16: Biblical
account of creation
Paragraphs 17-18: Christ’s
sacrifice and what it tells us
Paragraph 19: summarises
case so far.
Paragraph 20: is her case
unreasonable?
Paragraphs 21-22:
metaphysical arguments for God
Paragraphs 23-26: argument
to design
Paragraphs 27-28: laws of
nature, not Natural Law.
Paragraph 29: superstition
the enemy of knowledge.
Paragraphs 30-32:
universality of religion denied.
Paragraphs 33-34:
consequences of eliminated superstition.
Paragraphs 35-37: morality
does not depend on religion.
Paragraphs 38-39: what
atheism is.
The advantage of structuring
an argument for atheism in this way is that everything is seen as a
property of nature. It is not, as many religious apologists like to
claim, a titanic contest between supernaturalism and naturalism.
Supernatural thinking, like beetles, or battles, is just another
property of the natural world.
Though not specifically
named, traces of two other important thinkers on Rose’s address
can be spotted. The first of them is Baron Paul d’Holbach. A
strong indicator of d’Holbach’s influence is the
fundamental role Rose gives to motion as the inherent property of an
indestructible matter. (pp 4-5) Early on in his classic work, A
System of Nature,
d’Holbach speaks of motion in precisely this way. Of
materialist metaphysics D’Holbach writes: ‘Everything in
the universe is in motion; the essence of matter is to act: if we
consider its parts attentively, we shall discover that not a
particular enjoys absolute repose.’ (d’Holbach, p 18) In
many ways, A
Defence of Atheism
can be seen as a summary of A
System of Nature.
It is interesting that Rose
begins her survey of the sciences with geology. Since the publication
of Charles Lyell’s Principles
of Geology
in three volumes between 1830 and 1833, geology was propelled into
the forefront of the culture wars of the time. All of a sudden,
people realised the vast antiquity of the earth, the natural forces
that had fashioned it, and the many species that had perished along
the way. As Rose put it: ‘Geology speaks of the structure of
the Earth, the formation of the different strata, of coal, of
granite, of the whole mineral kingdom. It reveals the remains and
traces of animals long extinct, but gives not clue whereby we may
prove the existence of God.’ (Defence, p 4) A great deal of
Lyell’s early inspiration came from Alexander Humboldt, and
Rose speaks of the uniformity, regularity and interdependence of
nature that was so central a feature of Humboldt’s thinking.
Rose then proceeds through the hard sciences, arriving in each case
at the same conclusion. Chemistry, for example (‘Nature’s
great laboratory’) reveals the ‘indestructability of
matter, and its inherent property – motion’ (Defence, p
5)
The next clear, though
unnamed, influence becomes apparent when Rose moves on to the social
sciences. Here the influence of Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-72) shows
itself. In paragraphs eight to ten, having established, in a
d’Holbachian way, the primacy of the natural order, Rose
proceeds from the ‘universe of matter to the universe of mind’.
Whether beneficent or malevolent, mankind made God is its own image.
‘In describing his God, he delineated his own character: the
picture he drew represents in living and ineffaceable colours the
epoch of his existence – the period he lived in.’
(Defence of Atheism, p 5) This reflects very closely large sections
of Feuerbach’s The
Essence of Christianity
where, for example, he writes: ‘The personality of God is
nothing else than the projected personality of man.’
(Feuerbach, p 226) Some of Rose’s more memorable aphorisms have
a Feuerbachian flavour as well, as when she says ‘Ignorance is
the mother of Superstition.’ (Defence of Atheism, p 6
Only after this account of
the natural world and the place of religion within it, does Rose
venture into biblical criticism and responses to traditional theistic
arguments for the existence of God. Here the influence of the English
freethinkers and, indeed, her upbringing by an educated rabbi, are
apparent. Elements of Rose’s critique of the Bible and of the
standard arguments for the existence of God can be found in Carlile,
in Charles Southwell and George Jacob Holyoake. But the moral fire
that inspires these passages comes straight from Robert Owen, and
from her own experience of the injustice of the biblical view of the
world.
After outlining the
Christian claim that we are saved through Christ’s sacrifice,
Rose ponders the problem of evil:
‘Is the world saved?
Saved! From what? From ignorance? It is all around us. From poverty,
vice, crime, sin, misery and shame. It abounds everywhere. Look into
your poor-houses, your prisons, your lunatic asylums; contemplate the
whip, the instruments of torture, and of death; ask the murderer, or
his victim; listen to the ravings of the maniac, the shrieks of
distress, the groans of despair; mark the cruel deeds of the tyrant,
the crimes of slavery, and the suffering of the oppressed; count the
millions of lives lost by fire, by water, and by the sword; measure
the blood spilled, the tears shed, the sighs of agony drawn from the
expiring victims on the altar of fanaticism;–and tell me from
what the world was saved?’
(Defence, p 10)
The refutation of the
classical arguments for the existence of god are relatively
straight-forward and conventional. Rose begins with the cosmological
argument, then moves on to the first cause argument before spending
most of her time on the argument to design. Nothing especially
original is said here. She is at her best when she exposes the
theistic claims to begin from an argument from personal incredulity.
‘The mere fact of its
existence does not prove a Creator. Then how came the Universe into
existence? We do not know; but the ignorance of man is certainly no
proof of the existence of a God. Yet upon that very ignorance has it
been predicated, and is maintained. (pp 11-12)’
Rose also dispenses with the
presumption that the inter-connected web of the universe presupposes
a designer, something that would deny and break that very
inter-connectedness.
‘What is intelligence?
It is not a thing, a substance, an existence in itself, but simply a
property of matter, manifesting itself through organisations.’
Humboldt would have loved
that. So would Bertrand Russell. Rose also dispatches effectively the
hoary old canard that the choice is between design and chance.
‘Everything is
wonderful, and wonderful just in proportion as we are ignorant; but
that proves not ‘design’ or ‘designer’. But
did things come by chance? I am asked. Oh no. There is no such thing
as chance. It exists only in the perverted mind of the believer, who,
while insisting that God was the cause of everything, leaves Him
without any cause.’ (p 15)
Rose denies that morality
depends somehow on God. Morality, Rose writes,
‘depends on an
accurate knowledge of the nature of man, of the laws that govern his
being, the principles of right, or justice, and humanity, and the
conditions requisite to make him healthy, rational, virtuous and
happy.’ (p 18)
In few passages of Rose’s
Defence of
Atheism do
the shades of Robert Owen burn more brightly than here.
The
nature of Ernestine Rose’s atheism What,
then, can we say about Ernestine Rose’s atheism? We can perhaps
begin to answer this question by moving forward a few years, to 1869,
the year Thomas Henry Huxley felt the need to coin the term
‘agnosticism’. Huxley was unwilling to go as far as he
felt his contemporaries had in attaining a solution to the ‘problem
of existence’. As against their confidence ‘gnosis’
to this most intractable problem, Huxley felt sure he had not arrived
at so safe a destination. But, more than that, he declared a ‘pretty
strong conviction’ that the problem was insoluble. ‘And
with Kant and Hume on my side, I could not think myself presumptuous
in holding fast by that opinion.’ (Huxley, ‘Agnosticism’
162) Ernestine Rose’s address was only eight years before the
arrival of agnosticism. Can Rose’s Defence of Atheism be seen
as symptomatic of the problems that so worried Huxley? Is Rose’s
atheism an exercise in hard-nosed dogmatism?
In a word, no. At no point
does Ernestine Rose presume levels of knowledge unavailable to her,
or contrive some grand metaphysical sweep of the arm. Replying to the
transcendentalist, Rose is clear that the qualities of ‘devotion
and reverence, ideality and sublimity’ are all available to the
atheist. Indeed the simple appreciation of nature is more readily
appreciated by the person who does not contrive some uber-natural
explanation.
As well might we use the
terms Episcopalian, Unitarian, Universalist, to signify vice and
corruption, as the term atheist, which means simply a disbelief in a
God, because finding no demonstration of his existence, man’s
reason will not allow him to believe, nor his conviction to play the
hypocrite, and profess what he does not believe.’ (p 20)
Rose also avoided the
temptation of spiritualism, then sweeping the heterodox world.
Spiritualist thought was very popular among other campaigners for
women’s rights. It was thought to empower women, and so provide
avenues for enterprise free from the sway men held over all
conventional ecclesiastical channels. Even Rose’s mentor Robert
Owen succumbed to spiritualism in his last years. But Ernestine Rose
was never tempted. Spiritualism, she said in 1858, was as ‘foolish
in sentiment as it is false in principle and pernicious in practice.’
The whole subject was slippery, ‘like a live eel.’
(Anderson, p 114)
Is Rose vulnerable to a
charge of scientism? Only to those unwilling to accord science a
significant place in our understanding of the universe.
Only at the very end of her
address does Rose engage in language that can now be seen to read
badly. As part of a rhetorical conclusion, Rose lapses into what now
can be seen as unhelpfully anthropocentric eulogy, using the language
of faith.
Though I cannot believe in
your God whom you have failed to demonstrate, I believe in man; if I
have no faith in your religion, I have faith, unbounded, unshaken
faith in the principles of right, or justice, and humanity. (p 21)
A few sentences later, Rose
displays what now can be seen as unwarranted confidence that atheists
could be free of the sort of errors committed by the religious. The
‘monstrous crimes’ of the believer, she wrote, could not
be perpetrated by the atheist, because ‘knowing that belief is
not voluntary, but depends on evidence, and therefore there can be no
merit in the belief of any of the religions, not demerit in a
disbelief in all of them, could never be guilty of.’ (p 21).
Here Rose shows herself too sanguine. We have seen too much in the
twentieth century to agree with Rose on this point. (Hecht, 388)
These final flourishes to
her address undo somewhat the more grounded statements of the
previous paragraphs. Here, and only here, is there an unsatisfactory
tone to Rose’s address. In the twenty-first century, we see
anthropocentrism, making use of the language of faith, and sanguine
progressionism as mistakes, but it needs a large dose of hindsight
for that to be seen clearly. And seeing these traits as faults
presupposes the greater range of freedoms we enjoy, largely due to
the efforts of people like Ernestine Rose, who had to sustain their
life’s efforts with a confidence of this sort. A century and a
half after her courageous address, humanists are still groping for
the right means by which to express an outlook on the world and of
humanity that eschews both anthropocentrism on the one hand and
progressionism on the other. It is hardly a mark against Ernestine
Rose that she did not foresee these issues before the conditions that
give rise to them had risen.
These minor, post
facto,
faults notwithstanding, Rose cannot be seen, therefore, as an example
of hubristic overreach that worried Huxley and prompted his invention
of agnosticism. Rose’s atheism is grounded soundly in nature
and makes no large claims. Only when declaring a faith in man does
she inveigle the use of religious language in a way that can now be
seen as unsuccessful. Rose’s Defence
of Atheism
understands well the limitations of atheism. Atheism is no more than
the unwillingness to accept human testimony as to the existence of a
God or supernatural realm. How we proceed from that foundational
insight must be the preserve of something else. The least
unsatisfactory word that has arisen to express this approach is
humanism.
Emphasis here has been given
to the intellectual context of Rose’s address, and on the
thinkers who influenced her. Can it be concluded from this that her
work is derivative and therefore uninteresting? Though one can spot
influences in her work, it would be wrong to conclude that it is
diminished by this in any way. No work emerges without any
predecessors. What Rose did was to synthesise, creatively and
intelligently, into 39 paragraphs, a massive range of thinking.
With the quibbling exception
of the final rhetorical flourish, the main impression of A
Defence of Atheism
is how contemporary it feels. Rose’s talk reads well a century
and a half after it was written. It understands the limitations of
atheism, which means it is remarkably free of the anthropocentrism
that blights much of the transcendentalist agnosticism of the day. It
is informed by science without in any way unweaving the rainbow. And
it is the result of wide reading. And it was produced by someone with
significant restrictions on her leisure to indulge in wide reading
and deep thinking. Both these things happened, but in the context of
a busy life – one that eventually ruined her health – in
the service of others. Rose’s atheism was an integral part of
her life’s work on behalf of women’s rights and the
abolition of slavery. She was not merely an abolitionist and feminist
who happened to be an atheist. She was an abolitionist and feminist
because she was an atheist.
Bill Cooke
is an historian of atheism and humanism. His books include Dictionary
of Atheism, Skepticism and Humanism
(2006) and A
Wealth of Insights: Humanist Thought Since the Enlightenment
(2011). He is a senior editor of Free
Inquiry
and a columnist of the Secular
Humanist Bulletin.
Cooke is a Trustee of the New Zealand Association of Rationalists and
Humanists and an Honorary Associate of the Rationalist International.
He teaches philosophy in Warrington, in the United Kingdom.
Appendix
Breakdown of Ernestine
Rose’s A
Defence of Atheism.
Paragraph 1
Fears of addressing the
question. Error, from whatever source, is pernicious. 3
Paragraph 2
First quote: ‘by
searching none can find God’. Agrees, but from atheist
perspective. Science as the vehicle to offer an objective account.
Geology mentioned first. 3-4
Paragraph 3
Natural history (physiology,
phrenology [understood as psychology]) shows that there is ‘not
a spot can be found to indicate the existence of a God.’ 4
Paragraph 4
Neither does mathematics. 4
Paragraph 5
Neither does chemistry
(‘Nature’s great laboratory’). Posits
‘indestructability of matter, and its inherent property –
motion…’ (Holbach?) 4-5
Paragraph 6
Neither does astronomy. 5
Paragraph 7
Wraps up survey of the
sciences, with reference to Echo. 5
Paragraph 8
Moves from Universe of
Matter to the Universe of Mind. ‘In describing his God, he
delineated his own character: the picture he drew represents in
living and ineffaceable colours the epoch of his existence –
the period he lived in’ [Feuerbach?] 5
Paragraph 9
Reiterates that man made God
in his own image, whether the image was beneficent or malevolent. 6
Paragraph 10
Why has man behaved in this
way? ‘Ignorance is the mother of Superstition.’ 6
Paragraph 11
Introduces the Bible account
of creation and contrasts that with the scientific account. Mentions
Copernicus and Galileo. Asserts that nothing can be created from
nothing. 6-7
Paragraph 12
Brief mention of division of
waters above from waters below. 7
Paragraph 13
The creation of man in the
image of God as the reason for all of God’s previous creative
work. 7-8
Paragraph 14
Man placed in Eden. 8
Paragraph 15
Temptation of Eve suggests
problem of evil. If God did not know what was to happen his knowledge
was at fault. If he knew but chose not to intervene, his goodness was
at fault. ‘Choose which you please, and it remains alike fatal
to the rest.’ 8-9
Paragraph 16
Discussion on implications
of creating perfection in humans and finding them very imperfect. 9
Paragraph 17
Longest paragraph so far. In
face of continuing imperfection of man, God sends his son to redeem
fallen humanity. Long list of incidents of continuing misery which
has not been redeemed. ‘Why does God still permit these horrors
to afflict the race? Does omniscience not know it? Could omnipotence
not do it? Would infinite wisdom, power, and goodness allow his
children thus to live, to suffer, and to die? No! Humanity revolts
against such a supposition.’ 9-11
Paragraph 18
Continues on same theme: if
a parent neglected his children, promising a ‘fortune at some
time hereafter’ he would be justly condemned. So it should be
with God. 11
Paragraph 19
Summarises the case so
far. 11
Paragraph 20
Responds to objection of
being unreasonable. Turns it back on the believer who is more
unreasonable to expect one to believe what cannot be demonstrated to
exist. 11
Paragraph 21
Moves to more metaphysical
arguments. Created universe must have a creator. Assumes the universe
is infinite. 11-12
Paragraph 22
Applies same argument to the
First Cause. 12
Paragraph 23
Argument to design. Thinks
in terms of Great Chain of Being. 12-3
Paragraph 24
Design argument continued.
Paley’s watchmaker argument. Responds by noting the
contradictory objects of design. 13
Paragraph 25
Watchmaker argument
continued. If we were designed for wellness, how come illness, etc.
13-4
Paragraph 26
Design argument continued.
Cases of Providential design rebutted. 14-5
Paragraph 27
Denies that, by virtue of
rejecting design, the atheist believes in chance. Everything in the
universe ‘is governed by laws.’ 15
Paragraph 28
Some of the laws itemised.
Naturalistic humility espoused. 15
Paragraph 29
Superstition the enemy of
knowledge. 15
Paragraph 30
Religion is natural and
belief in God universal. Both notions denied, citing Livingstone and
Humboldt. 15-6
Paragraph 31
Natural religion continued.
We are born atheists, not believers. 16-7
Paragraph 32
The corrupt priesthood, who
profit on the belief that without religion the world would descend
into chaos. 17
Paragraph 33
Sweep away all the
superstition and nature would be unchanged. Mankind would also be as
capable of noble thoughts and actions as now. 17-8
Paragraph 34
Sweep away all the
superstition and mankind would in fact prosper. 18
Paragraph 35
Morality does not depend on
religious belief. Cites pro-slave Northern churchman Rev. Van Dyke
and [Morris Jacob] Raphall (1798-1868) pro-slavery Rabbi. And fact
that the South cited Infidelity as the reason for anti-slave
attitudes. 18
Paragraph 36
Belief in God has not
produced a desirable end. Fear should give way to learning, etc. 19
Paragraph 37
Responds to claims by
‘refined and transcendental religionists’ that religion
nurtures all the most elevated human motivations and feelings. Denies
this, saying they can be nurtured just as much by reverencing
‘justice and truth.’ 19-20
Paragraph 38
Decries the way religionists
seek to besmirch the term ‘atheist’. Criticises ‘some
of the Infidels who stretch and force the term Atheist out of its
legitimate significance.’ Defines atheism as ‘simply a
disbelief in a God, because finding no demonstration of his
existence, man’s reason will not allow him to believe, nor his
conviction to play the hypocrite, and profess what he does not
believe.’ 20-1
Paragraph 39
The atheist believes not in
God but in man. Has ‘unbounded, unshaken faith in the
principles of right, of justice, and humanity.’ ‘Whatever
good you would do out of fear of punishment, or hope of reward
hereafter, the Atheist would do simply because it
is good;
and being
so, he
would receive the far surer and more certain reward, springing from
well-doing, which would constitute his pleasure, and promote his
happiness.
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